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THE METAFORMAL SYSTEM: COMPLETING 
THE THEORY OF LANGUAGE 
Christopher Michael Langan 
ABSTRACT: The standard theory of languages has two levels, one centering on the study, 
teaching, and application of natural languages, and the other on formal languages and formal 
systems as applied throughout the mathematical and empirical sciences, in analytic philosophy, 
and for computer programming, software engineering, artificial intelligence, and related 
technologies. On both of these levels, standard language theory is dualistic, defining languages in 
isolation from their domains of discourse and treating attributes in isolation from their objective 
instances while omitting important properties and functions ordinarily provided or executed by 
language users, automata, or physical systems on which they appear to supervene. This 
decoupling of languages from their universes, and from necessary linguistic functions such 
as display, processing, interpretation, and communication, has profound epistemological 
bearing, limiting scientific knowledge by precluding the linguistic formulation of 
any verifiable comprehensive description of reality. This paper proposes that in addition to 
the two existing levels of standard language theory involving natural and formal 
languages and systems, the theory of language be recognized to possess a third “metaformal” 
level on which languages and their universes are “wrapped” in a uniquely structured, totally 
self-contained  metalanguage, the Metaformal System, which restores missing linguistic 
functionality while using a supertautological intelligibility criterion to generically 
couple languages with their universes on a fundamental level of shared structure and 
dynamics, thereby restoring the potential for a verifiable comprehensive and fully connected 
understanding of the reality we share. 
KEYWORDS: Language Theory, Generative Grammar, Metaformal, Formal Language, 
Formal System, Metalanguage, CTMU  
THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE 
Language, which is widely regarded as an artificial construction of human beings, is 
conventionally defined in a variety of ways associated with various perspectives on
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philosophy, psychology, sociology, and pedagogy, often with an emphasis on culture 
and politics, and with various technical prerogatives having mostly to do with the study 
and employment of automata. This has led to an emphasis on linguistic variety and 
contextual specificity, with variations cancelling out rather than summing to a 
meaningful overall characterization. Thus, the “bare bones” definition of language 
omits any reference to content, application, or structure, reducing it to an abstract set 
of “strings” or linear sequences of sounds or symbols devoid of meaning. 
 All existing definitions of language – even those which delve deeply into its 
structure, production, genesis, and evolution, or have to do with its formalization or 
computational application - sell it short by restricting its definition and ignoring its 
ubiquity. In reality, language is not dependent on the vagaries of human culture and 
psychology, the preferences of academic specialists, or the capacity, functionality, or 
architecture of computational machinery. In fact, language is the most general and 
necessary abstract structure in mathematics, the protean abstract structure of which all 
other structures are instances by virtue of their effability and mathematical descriptions 
alone. Its generality is reflected in the fact that it can be equally well described as an 
object, attribute, process, or operational medium, and in fact as all of these in seamless 
combination. 
From a technical standpoint, one of the most important features of language is that 
its study is necessarily self-referential. That is, any attempt to define, describe, analyze, 
or construct language uses language itself to do so. Self-referentiality is a powerful and 
underexplored feature of language, one which has puzzled and fascinated mankind for 
centuries. But at the juncture where language meets cognition, it is also a source of 
logical and epistemological complications. Due in part to these complications, language 
has met with many apparent failures, ranging from piles of self-contradictory and 
seemingly unproductive philosophical verbiage to the undefinability and undecidability 
problems of formal language-systems. 
 There are many who seem to believe that this is the end of the story, and that 
language-using creatures such as we will never understand or agree on the nature of 
the reality we inhabit. But fortunately for science, philosophy, and the intellectual 
destiny of mankind, complete surrender to epistemological relativism turns out to be 
premature. 
  THE STRATIFIED THEORY OF LANGUAGE 
 The standard theory of language recognizes two main classes of language, natural and 
formal, each occupying its own compartment. These compartments may be respectively 
described as: 
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(1) The mostly academic study of human language acquisition and usage and
the structure and grammar of various natural languages. A natural language is
any human language, whether spoken, written, or manually signed, that
appears to have arisen spontaneously and evolved naturally, through
repetition with variation, usually along with the native culture of a specific
population. Natural languages are used for routine self-expression and
communication, public speaking, literary production, governance,
commerce, and other purposes to which ease and freedom of expression and
understanding are important.
(2) The (mostly academic and industrial) study and application of formal
languages and systems and computational languages. Formal languages are
often just natural languages that have undergone some degree of
formalization, usually with convenient simplification and technical
standardization. They are used wherever clarity, precision, and lack of
ambiguity are required. Applications include mathematics, the empirical
sciences, computer science, engineering, and other fields where exact
technical specifications must be expressed and communicated with
maximum precision and minimal semantic ambiguity.
 Just as it would be hard to overstate the importance of natural language to (e.g.) 
human psychology, social organization, and psychosocial evolution, it would be hard to 
overstate the importance of formal language to science and technology. The 
mathematical sciences overwhelmingly rely on formal systems, especially “proof 
systems”, to achieve their results. The empirical sciences are equally reliant on formal 
systems, which are theoretically coupled with observation and experimentation as 
prescribed by the Scientific Method. As for computer science and the information 
technology that supports modern civilization, they clearly rely as heavily on language 
as they do on computers. 
 If we regard natural and formal languages as the first two levels of modern 
language theory, it is possible to identify a third. Whereas the first two levels are 
dualistic, taking languages in isolation from their universes, the third is monic and self-
dual, structurally fusing language and universe into a single coherent identity on the 
highest possible level of discourse. Featuring an intrinsic definition of language which is 
analogous to intrinsic geometry in its self-containment and external independence, it 
consists entirely of identities, or coherent self-dual language-universe couplings, and the 
operators and operations which generate and act on them. 
 This logico-metaphysical level of language theory is designed to formulate and 
address fundamental metaphysical and metalogical questions regarding a 
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comprehensive and therefore totally self-contained reality with respect to which 
nothing deeper or more extensive exists, regarding which no external references are 
possible, and in which literally everything comes down to the self-reference of a self-
defined language-universe complex that has no background and to which nothing 
intelligible is external. This is the level on which language merges with universe, and 
on which signs and symbols merge with their associated objects, interpretations, and 
interpreters. Or in more pedestrian terms:  
(3) The level on which language can be productively employed in the conclusive
identification and analysis of reality in part and in whole, i.e., on which
language and universe are generically coupled in terms of common structure
and intelligibility. It is on this level that the true and ultimate nature of reality
- that which we can know of it strictly on the basis of our ability to sense it
and draw logical inferences about it - can be fruitfully explored.
Where the deceptive dualistic isolation of language from universe obscures their 
true relationship and precludes certainty, conclusive identification is impossible. But as 
physical reality can in fact be clearly identified through direct observation and logical 
deduction, without which neither science nor human experience could exist, and as 
deductive logic is a formal language inherent in cognition, this assumed linguistic 
incapacity is unfounded and illusory. Hence, the third level of language theory herein 
proposed already has an irrefutable basis.  
 Let us more closely examine these levels of linguistic theorization. 
LEVEL 1: NATURAL LANGUAGES 
A natural language is conventionally understood as the system and method of spoken or 
written expression and communication among human beings to whose various 
communities, nations, and cultures it is particular. Natural languages “evolve 
naturally” in real-world communities of language users, often in coupling with their 
cultures and conventions.  
Natural languages consist of the structured and conventional use of words, i.e., 
meaningful elements of speech or writing that (where not used alone) are organized to 
form sentences. A sentence is a complete sequence of words typically containing a subject 
and a predicate which assigns some attribute, often involving an action, to the subject, 
thus constituting an attributive statement. A sentence includes a main clause which can 
stand alone but may have one or more subordinate clauses attached, and can take 
the form of a question, command, or exclamation without losing attributive 
functionality. 
A given natural language L = (Σ, Γ, SΣ) can be specified in terms of (1) a finite 
alphabet Σ =   (s1, s2,…, sn) of uninterpreted terminal symbols si that can be linearly 
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combined to form written words and expressions and are often associated with sounds 
that can be spoken in the same order, along with any transitory nonterminal symbols; (2) a 
grammar or set of structural and transformational rules Γ which determine which strings or 
sequences of alphabetic symbols and words are "well-formed", i.e., which strings are 
potentially meaningful expressions of the language, and (3) the set SΣ of strings determined 
by Γ. Whereas expressions contain only terminal symbols of Σ ,  Γ may use any 
nonterminal symbols in Σ as means to its ends, inserting and then replacing them with 
other symbols in order to produce or “derive” terminal expressions as the final output of 
derivation trees orthogonal to the expressions themselves in the ordering of their 
derivational steps. In this case, the alphabet Σ may be divided into two sets N and T 
containing nonterminal and terminal symbols respectively: Σ = (N, T).
There are two possible ways to construct a string or expression of L. One can write 
the expression as a linear sequence of terminal symbols and words by using a set of 
orthographic rules according to which one symbol or word follows another by 
concatenation or composition. Alternatively, one can rely on rules of production or 
generation consisting of syntactic forms and rules of substitution. Production works 
orthogonally to strings themselves, deriving a string by replacing nonterminal symbols 
with cumulative refinements along its entire length. Generative grammar begins with 
the universal start symbol of L, a compact way of representing L as a complete 
expressive potential, and progressively replaces nonterminal symbols with other 
nonterminal symbols and finally with the terminal symbols of the final expression.  
The grammar of a natural language can be complex and unpredictable, and 
is typically discovered through intensive empirical investigation; until it is “formalized” 
by exhaustively enumerating its rules, the language generated by the grammar cannot 
be formalized, and the formal definition L = (Σ, Γ, SΣ) remains useless for 
reconstructing the language. The formalization criteria described and illustrated above 
are due to Zellig Harris, who first described generative grammar as currently 
understood (1951), and his student Noam Chomsky, who subsequently named and 
explicated the concept. (1956) 
Natural language is fundamentally conceptual; its words represent concepts or 
mental abstractions. The words and signs attached to the concepts are more or less 
arbitrary; they can vary as long as the concepts themselves retain their integrity. 
However, there is some amount of controversy regarding the relationship between 
language structure and cognition. Theories of this relationship range from universalism 
(cognition determines language), through mutual independence, all the way to strong 
linguistic determinism (language determines cognition), with intermediate degrees of 
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dependency considered. 
Note that while this account of natural language refers to the representation of 
concepts, nowhere does it refer to the objective content, meaning, or interpretation of its 
expressions. Yet even though one of the primary functions of language is to represent 
objective facts about the real world - facts which naturally reflect its structure - the 
natural language concept is defined in complete abstraction from the external universe, 
which is commonly treated as though it were completely “independent” of language 
and cognition. This putative mutual independence of language and universe – the way 
L = (Σ, Γ, SΣ) omits the symbol U for “universe”, thus isolating L from its domain of 
discourse - amounts to a pernicious form of dualism which abstractly, artificially, and 
wrongly separates the elements of an inseparable pair.  
In short, the capacity of language to accurately represent the external universe is 
far too reliable and extensive for this unequivocal kind of dualism to hold. It is not that 
we are always successful in predicting factual observations from language alone; rather, 
it is the very possibility of bringing language into conformance with reality (and vice versa) that 
dualism cannot explain. If dualism were justified, and language and reality were truly 
separate and independent, then there would be no basis for bringing them together, 
and neither science nor any form of human experience would be possible. The above 
definition, L = (Σ, Γ, SΣ), is therefore misleading in the way that its parentheses, like 
impermeable walls, isolate human cognitive language from the universe it so effectively 
but improbably represents.  
Some readers will recognize that this is simply a formal generalization of the oft-
cited “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences” to 
nonmathematical languages and reality at large. It is also a statement to the effect that 
any language which truly supports the identification of its universe must everywhere 
couple to that universe through classical 2-valued logic, which provides the 1|0 
distinction in terms of which U and its contents may be distinguished. This coupling is 
an untapped well that goes very deep indeed. 
LEVEL 2: FORMAL LANGUAGES AND SYSTEMS 
Any natural language can be formalized to the extent that its alphabet is known and its 
grammar has been formalized, i.e., fully determined by empirical investigation 
and exhaustively enumerated. That is, a formal language is a natural language L = (Σ, 
Γ, SΣ) for which the elements of the signature and the rules of grammar are exhaustively 
enumerated.   
A formal language L usually comes implicitly packaged with a metalanguage L’ which 
supports the description and analysis of its structure, functionality, and application. It 
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also comes with predicate and propositional logic, which it requires for its intelligibility 
and functionality. While logic stands alone, being formulated independently and 
invariantly with respect to the other languages to which it is applied, it is itself a formal 
language conforming to the same general description. In addition, L must incorporate 
such abstract qualitative and quantitative concepts and relationships as may be 
necessary to specifically identify its content.  
In contrast to the often-complex grammar of a natural language, the grammar of 
an artificial formal language like propositional logic (PL) is simple by design. Its 
properties are not empirically discovered but chosen for precise expression and 
analysis. In particular, PL is designed to analyze and describe the relationships among 
conjunctions, disjunctions, conditionals, and negations (and, or, if-then, if  and only if, not) 
linking arbitrary sentences (sentential variables) to each other, i.e., to precisely model 
key properties of the logical operators and connectives naturally inherent in human 
cognition so that statements can be reliably and consistently formulated and reliably 
classified as true or false. 
Any sufficiently expressive formal language L with an easily recognized (or at least 
computable) grammar can be incorporated in a formal system T which adjoins to L a 
deductive apparatus, or a set of axioms and rules of inference designed for the systematic 
investigation of some specific universe U (domain of discourse or field of knowledge) U. 
Data from U are plugged into T, and conclusions are deduced in T regarding U. 
A formal system T can be defined as T = (L, A, I), where L is a formal language, A 
is a set of axioms, and I is a set of rules of inference. The deductive apparatus {A,I} 
can be viewed as an expanded version of the grammar Γ of L, somewhat blurring the 
distinction between a formal system and a formal language. However, L and T can 
often be distinguished by two related facts: (1) the syntactic forms of L usually contain 
nonterminal symbols representing word-classes or “parts of speech”, whereas 
the axioms of T usually do not; and (2) the production of expressions by the rules of Γ 
usually involves nonterminals, whereas the derivation of consequences from axioms 
using the rules of inference of T usually does not.  
Predicate logic, including sentential or propositional logic, is implicit in any formal 
system T. This is because logic must distribute over every part and every element of T 
no matter how T is partitioned and quantized. It takes predicate logic to form 
attributions, and propositional logic to identify them from their logical complements; 
without logic, there can be no discernibility. Also implicit in any formal system T is a 
metalanguage defining and relating its components.  
The second level of the standard theory of languages, studied mainly in 
mathematical logic and computer science, includes the study and application of these 
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formal languages and systems, the means of proving theorems from their axioms, and 
their valid interpretations or models in their respective domains of discourse U. 
THE LIMITATIONS OF FORMAL SYSTEMS 
Despite their inadequacies, formal systems are powerful tools of (partial) 
understanding. However, a formal language omits its array, its processors, its universe, 
its models, the capacity to determine how it evolves (telesis), and even the capacity to 
perform its own linguistic operations such as read, write, and erase, let alone more 
advanced operations like the expression and communication of meaning. It is thus 
completely unable to stand on its own, instead relying on language users and 
sometimes on computers. It is therefore unable to model (share structure with) a 
perfectly self-contained universe. To do that, it must assimilate that on which it 
implicitly depends.  
Note that formal systems are limited in the same way as language in general; just 
as for L = (Σ, Γ, SΣ), the formal system T = (L, A, I) contains no symbol U representing 
the external universe. Again, the parentheses effectively wall off L and T, effectively 
isolating them and offering no assurance that T can be successfully interpreted in any 
given U. Thus, a given U need not preserve the structure of T, provide T with a model, 
or conform to T as semantic content; until it has been fully explored and put into 
exhaustive correspondence with T, the actual relationship between T and U is 
uncertain. In short, a formal system comes with what philosophers have called the 
problem of  induction. 
This model-theoretic formulation of the problem of induction implies that as long 
as theories of science, philosophy, and mathematics are regarded as formal systems (or 
something even less reliable), they can afford no certainty with respect to the real 
universe, and therefore cannot yield a verifiable understanding of reality. Indeed, the 
scientific investigation of reality is limited in just this way. Beholden as it is to the 
scientific method, the sciences have been limited to establishing tentative 
correspondences between formal systems and sets of physical observations (or 
subjective conceptualizations), and thus doomed to non-validation and epistemological 
inadequacy. 
While it can be hard to establish that a given language has a model in a given 
universe, especially when the correspondence must be monitored and maintained “in 
real time” as U evolves, there are cases in which a model-theoretic correspondence can 
be taken for granted. For example, we can trivially define U on L; given the internal 
consistency of L, we can simply define U to be any universe that conforms to L. This is 
how mathematical theories and their underlying conceptual languages are often 
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treated; their domains of discourse are simply defined as any universe U, i.e., any set of 
objects, relations, and functions, in which L can be modeled by virtue of common 
structure, i.e., by virtue of the nonempty structural intersect of L and U.   
On the other hand, the structure of U must be known in order to define L on U, 
and U may not be completely knowable (e.g., in the empirical sciences, nothing about 
the observable universe can be taken for granted). In this case, it is natural to ask 
whether there exists any formal language L whose compatibility with any given U can 
be taken for granted.  
Provided that U and its contents are intelligible or identifiable, the answer is yes. 
Any form of identification, conceptual, perceptual or otherwise, amounts to 
distinguishing something from its logical complement. This requires the formal 
language of logic, especially 2-valued propositional logic, which functions in effect as 
an “identification language” of U. By virtue of the very possibility of apprehending a 
given universe – by virtue of its intelligibility – it must everywhere incorporate the formal 
system “logic”. Conversely, any supposed part or aspect of U devoid of logical structure 
cannot be identified, and is therefore not recognized as a part or aspect of U.  
In short, logic evidently functions as a kind of “identity language” for U – 
something like the set of criteria through which a computer identifies input, or dually, 
an attribute that U displays in order to be identified. But it cannot do this alone, for 
whatever logic distinguishes from its logical complement must exhibit nonlogical 
properties – size, color, duration, and so on - of which it is an instance. So it appears 
that we must add these logical and nonlogical ingredients together to get a functional 
identity language L. But we still have a problem, as propositional logic can only 
identify full attributions. There must also be something capable of coupling the 
attributes in L to the objects in U, and while predicate logic comes with means of 
quantification, it has no way of producing or selecting such nonlogical attributes in 
order to couple them with the contents of U. 
Throughout the empirical sciences (and most other sciences and the humanities as 
well), it is roundly denied that the physical universe and its internal content, or states, 
arise in coupling with L. Instead, it is held that physical reality evolves according to its 
own internal causal processes, mechanisms, and laws, despite the obvious fact that 
“laws” are formal (abstract, qualitative) entities. As usually conceived, causation is 
dualistic; it requires that reality evolve independently of any language, with causal 
functions that are metrically parameterized exclusively by the objects and independent 
medium on which they act. But this leads to a contradiction: it implicitly presupposes, 
once again, that U is already coupled with an intrinsic self-identity language that 
provides it with attributes and values from which to form the states which comprise the 
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input and output of causal functions. In short, dualistic, language-independent physical 
causation implies that U is already inseparably coupled with its very own identity-
language, which just happens to be the same as ours.  
Finally, we realize that we might as well cut to the chase: Somehow, an intelligible 
universe, one that we can actually identify, must already be coupled with an identity-
language. The simple fact is that where any degree of intelligibility is given, structure 
must already be shared between mind and external reality; mind must be equipped 
with a cognitive identity language L through which U can be recognized, and in a 
complementary way, U must have the capacity to display content recognizable to L. 
Unless these dual requirements are filled, the mind has no way to reach out and 
acquire external reality, and external reality has no way to send itself into the mind. 
And that, of course, means that the question is really just this: What are the 
implications of the fact that mind and reality already share structure which includes 
logic and various nonlogical attributes?  
This is not the only issue in overcoming linguistic dualism. Standard dualistic 
languages lack a number of self-containment properties. They lack closure with respect 
to not just modeling and the acquisition of content (reference), but such functions as read, 
write, production, processing, display, communication, and the selection or execution of any 
constructive or restrictive process or mapping that might generate expressions or restrict 
the exhaustive linguistic potential represented by {SΣ}, the exhaustive set of all 
grammatically well-formed strings. In order to determine and perform these 
operations, languages require ingredients that are not contained in their standard 
dualistic definitions. Dualistic language theory excludes everything that makes 
language telic or dynamic, waving it off to some language-user or programmed 
automaton, or supervening it on some random or determinate physical process that 
supposedly has no need of it.  
THE METAFORMAL SYSTEM: AN INFORMAL INTRODUCTION 
Due to limitations of time and space, this account is brief and non-justificative. We 
cannot hope to give anything but the most summary and superficial account of the 
Metaformal System in this paper. 
First, it might be wondered why this paper is entitled “The Metaformal System” 
rather than “Metaformal Systems”. This is because the only metaformal system known 
to exist is that which corresponds to reality as we know it, and as far as we know, there 
are no other realities to be considered (this system has been known for the last several 
decades as the Cognitive Theoretic Model of  the Universe or CTMU; Langan, 2002).  There 
are other essentially metaphysical constructs, including the Everett “Many Worlds” 
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interpretation of quantum mechanics (1956) and the Tegmark “Mathematical Universe 
Hypothesis”, which speculatively refer to other possible realities (2008). But such acts of 
reference connect these “other” possible realities to this one, implying that the resulting 
web of interconnections constitutes one overarching “ultimate reality” after all. It is this 
ultimate reality that the Metaformal System represents. 
The Metaformal System is an “extended formal system” which is perfectly self-
contained, i.e., which has all of the properties and carries all of the ingredients required 
for its existence and functionality, including those just mentioned (read, write, reference, 
interpretation, production, processing, display, communication, potentiation, determination, and so 
on). In short, all of these functions are executed by objects of M (syntactors, telors) 
using the grammar of M. 
Even though the Metaformal System can hold an arbitrary number of formal 
systems in its framework, it can be represented in or described by a formal system of its 
own. This is how it is represented even here, on paper and on monitor screens 
controlled by patterns of bits in electronic computers. However, despite the fact that the 
Metaformal System can be described by a formal system, i.e., embedded in the formal 
system as descriptive content, it turns the tables, mapping into its own structure the 
very formal system which describes it along with any language-user reading the formal 
description. In relating itself to its own ingredients, M places itself in its own universe 
by a self-dual grammatical inclusion mapping called involution, and is thus a 
metalanguage of not only the formal systems in question, but itself.  
The Metaformal System can be thought of as a kind of “closed wrapper” for 
formal systems. The wrapper is a supertautological metalanguage (Langan, 2002, 2017) 
in which formal systems are “located” or assigned a place in M as referential content 
on the basis of shared structure. Specifically, they are located in LM, the formal or 
linguistic aspect of the Metaformal System M, the identity-language of UM which contains 
all of the abstract properties which suffice to identify not only UM, but all that can be 
identified in the ontic identity M = LM|UM including all of its internal subidentities or 
discernible attribute|value couplings. Some of these identities and subidentities are 
telors, which are defined in terms of functional capacity and include human beings; M 
thus absorbs human language-users and the linguistic functions they perform, firmly 
embedding them in the metaformal structure of reality.   
The Metaformalist Program, as it has previously been called (Langan, 2018), 
requires that language function as an identity, specifically the identity of a universe. 
That the universe we inhabit is intelligible to us means that our internal cognitive-
perceptual language couples (interfaces or intersects) with it, allowing us to identify it 
by direct perception. It is in this sense that we function as “identification operators”, 
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using our cognitive language as an identity language to identify the universe and its 
contents including ourselves. Because identification operators use the syntax (formal 
structure) of an identity language to identify their operands, they are called syntactic 
operators or syntactors. Telors are structurally complex syntactors which can “factorize 
telesis” or actualize ontic potential, and have sufficient complexity to consciously 
generate internal representations of themselves and their relationships with the external 
environment.      
The grammatical language|universe coupling effected by M is self-dual in the sense 
that language and universe are just different aspects of shared structure in which they 
everywhere intersect. This implies that they are the source and target, or (dually) the 
target and source, of a mutual dualization mapping (involution) which generically 
“models” one in the other. The coincidence of language, universe, and model makes 
the entire three-way coincidence not just self-dual, but trialic. (Triality was adumbrated 
by the American logician Charles Sanders Peirce (1976), whose semiotic approach to 
logic characterized signs in terms of three classes: signifier, object, and interpretant.) 
Because language is one of its coinciding aspects (no matter what its particulars may be 
and regardless of the degree to which they are specified in advance), this relationship 
has linguistic structure. Specifically, it is a new kind of “language” called an intrinsic 
language.  
An intrinsic language can be understood as a trialic (three-aspect) self-identification 
language which does triple duty as language, universe, and model while functioning as 
a global primary syntactor, of which internally localized secondary and tertiary 
syntactors are points of  involution (targets of the grammatical involution mapping). The 
primary syntactor, which is also the Primary Telor or universal start symbol of M-
grammar, spans the entire involution mapping from LM to UM, while tertiary syntactors 
are confined to the UM (terminal, physical) end and include fermionic (mutually 
exclusionary) pointlike particles. Secondary syntactors occupy the terminal region of 
the mapping to variable depth, where - in their dual role as secondary telors - they fill 
causal deficits due to the underdetermination of tertiary syntactors by the Primary Telor, 
which is invariant with respect to them and of which they are images by µ-morphic 
involution (the grammatical involution mapping is also called the µ-morphism).   
At the trialic limit where the semiotic representation relationship between intension 
and extension contracts to form self-dual intension|extension identities as required by 
systemic self-duality, information "about" the state and evolution of the system on all 
scales equates to the evolution of the system itself; in evolving, the system is "informing 
itself" of its own evolution. Primary, secondary, and tertiary syntactic operators 
generate three levels of information. Primary information is associated with the 
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primary syntactor and best described as teleology; its function is to provide for the 
requirements of self-identification on all scales down to that of tertiary syntactors. 
(Where generic utility is that which enhances identity or “selfhood”, a utilitarian 
definition of teleology as the maximization of generic utility equates it to the Self-
reinforcement of the identity of reality or Primary Telor.) (2003) Tertiary syntactors are 
the quantum objects of which secondary syntactors are composed and in which their 
extended phenotypes materially intersect. Tertiary information, which is about the 
terminal "surface” level of evolution and equates to it when attributes and values are 
merged as terminal identities by full LM-UM coupling, is the only level studied in 
physics and other empirical (terminal, surface-level) sciences. Secondary information 
fills causal deficits which owe to the underdetermination of tertiary states and 
interactions by primary information, this being the local freedom of the system and its 
inhabitants. 
THE METAFORMAL SYSTEM, A BIT LESS INFORMALLY 
In much the same way as a formal language, the Metaformal System can be formally 
expressed as:  
M = LINT = Ls|Lo = (Σ={N,T}, ΓMU, SΣ) 
M AS A WHOLE 
Moving from left to right, “M = LINT” says that the Metaformal System is an intrinsic 
language. Complete (ontic) self-containment is required of both M and LINT, implying 
structural equivalence. It turns out that this intrinsic language doubles as a pair of 
complementary semilanguages, Ls and Lo, that are in fact dual to each other insofar as 
they comprise the intensional and extensional aspects of M.  
Notice that “M = (Σ={N,T}, ΓMU, SΣ)” is very close to the way in which formal 
languages are defined, with a signature, a grammar, and a set of linear “strings”. The 
meaning is almost as simple: The fundamental objects of M are active signs called 
telors (N) and syntactors (T), and its grammar ΓMU is a self-identification operation which, 
just as in a standard language, “identifies” strings by writing or generatively 
producing them. In other words, M evolves by “identifying itself ”.
The generative derivation and orthographic dimensions of self-identification are 
orthogonal, but not entirely independent; N and T must be continuously coupled so that 
telors can use ΓMU to acquire terminal resources from T for grammatical transformation 
in N.  
The metaformal intrinsic language M is an ingredient of its own syntax on all 
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orders of reference. That is, M is self-referential and logically idempotent (Langan, 
2017). 
SIGNATURE 
In the signature Σ={N,T}, the subsets N and T of Σ are sets of nonterminal and 
terminal identity operators respectively; N = {telors} and T = {syntactors}. These two 
kinds of “active sign” are distinguished by functionality as well as location; because 
production (“derivation”) occurs in N while concatenation (“write”) occurs in T, telors 
can generatively produce entire strings in a spacelike or “nonlocal” fashion, while non-
teloric (tertiary) syntactors, being restricted by the locality, timelike linearity, and 
continuity of T, cannot.  
The signs in Σ are all identity operators which use M as an identity language to 
identify the world; hence, all are syntactors. There are three levels of syntactor: 
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The primary and tertiary levels respectively 
correspond to the universe as a whole, and the smallest and most elementary objects 
therein; the secondary level is intermediate.  
N and T, which can be respectively likened to the internal and external and/or the 
mental and physical aspects of reality - and at the risk of considerable 
oversimplification, to a programmable automaton and its display screen - have some 
amount of overlap; every telor is a syntactor, but not every syntactor is a telor. Primary 
and secondary syntactors are telors, but tertiary syntactors are not.  
Telors can exist in both N and T; tertiary syntactors can exist only in T. Because 
grammar operates mainly in N, only telors can fully exploit its power, generating 
spacelike derivation trees which output terminal strings in parallel, across time. But in 
order to meaningfully do so, they must have sufficient complexity in T to model their 
own relationships with the external environment.  
GRAMMAR AND SEMIMODELS 
ΓMU is a self-dual distribution mapping, the µ-morphism, that is inwardly involutive and 
consists of spacelike metatemporal parse trees which produce terminal states and 
trajectories in T, but outwardly evolutive with respect to the timelike linear trajectories 
thus produced. µ-morphism is associated with a rescaling operation called conspansion, 
which occurs in a conspansive manifold which takes the form of a syntactor bundle, a self-
dual analogue of the topological construct known as a “fiber bundle”.  
Conspansion is a coupling of spacelike dual processes, inner expansion or d-
ectomorphism, a one-to-many mapping which outwardly distributes compact identities 
(states, points) to potentials, and collapse or d-endomorphism, a one-to-many dual mapping 
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which inwardly distributes attributes to states or points. (The d- stands for 
“distributive”.) The self-dual conspansion morphism corresponds to the conspansive 
semimodel of M, which models derivation and is associated with the nonterminal 
semilanguage Ls; it evolves discretely and in just the way that reality appears to evolve 
in the quantum-theoretic picture.  
The terminal analogue and dual model of the conspansive semimodel, the linear-
ectomorphic (or l-ectomorphic) semimodel of M associated with Lo, is based on dual (inward 
and outward) conspansive gradients and yields a very different picture of M, namely 
the classical one that we see and hear, in which terminal objects follow linear 
trajectories through “spacetime”, which – together with its physical content - amounts 
to the surface structure of the conspansive medium. The superposition of these dual 
semimodels reflect the fact that reality evolves by self-dually “modeling itself ” in two 
complementary ways, only one of which we actually see when we look outward, but in 
the other of which true ΓMU dynamics reside.  
SEMILANGUAGES 
Ls and Lo are dual semilanguages into which LINT is “factorized” by ΓMU. Ls and Lo 
correspond to N and T respectively.  
Ls and Lo correspond to the linguistic structure superimposed by M on the sets N 
and T respectively, providing the elements of N and T (telors and syntactors) with 
enough structure and organization to productively interact and fill their roles as 
identification operators. Respectively corresponding to the intensional and extensional 
aspects of M, they remain in superposition as ΓMU locks them together in order to form 
the self-dual identities that comprise the terminal states of M.  
Simplistically, Ls exists “inside” secondary telors of N, while Lo consists of the 
external states and trajectories or state-transitions of their constituent tertiary syntactors. 
As Ls transforms and is dually transformed by Lo through the action of ΓMU, Ls is 
conspansively “involuted” in metatime, and Lo “evolves” linearly in time along dual 
conspansive gradients.   
STRINGS 
SΣ ⊃ T, the set of “terminal strings” of M, consists of the external states and trajectories 
of syntactors. SΣ, associated with the semilanguage Lo, occupies the “surface structure” 
of M. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEVELS 1, 2, AND 3 
Level 1: Natural Languages 
In a natural language, expressions are produced by writing or speaking linear 
sequences of words (or signing in a sequence of gestures). Empirical investigation of 
natural language grammars reveals that beneath their surface structure, they have deep 
structure which can be explicated in terms of word-classes (“nonterminal symbols”) and 
phrase markers (parse trees, derivation trees). These phrase markers have derivational 
structure orthogonal to the linear expressions on which they terminate, suggesting that 
expressions are actually generated along two axes. 
Natural language grammars are sometimes classified in terms of the least powerful 
acceptor, or language-recognizing automaton, that can recognize the languages they 
generate. As defined in the Chomsky Hierarchy, type 0 grammars generate 
unrestricted languages requiring a universal computer (Turing machine) with unlimited 
memory; type 1 grammars generate context-sensitive languages requiring a linear-
bounded automaton with memory proportional to word length; type 2 grammars 
generate context-free languages requiring a pushdown automaton with a memory stack 
in which a fixed number of elements are available at any point; and type 3 grammars 
generate regular languages requiring a finite deterministic automaton with no memory. 
(Chomsky, 1956) 
Note that where languages are defined on the grammars that generate them, and 
grammars are classified in terms of automata, languages themselves are implicitly 
classified in terms of automata. This language-automaton association has been in force 
since the mid-20th century, and it has only reinforced the unavoidable theoretical 
coupling of natural language with human cognition.    
Level 2: Formal Languages and Systems 
In a formal system T, the production grammar of the formal base language L refines 
nonterminal symbols to terminal symbols, progressively applying rules of substitution 
or transformation to a universal nonterminal “start symbol” representing the entirety 
or “identity” of L, terminating on fully formed expressions which contain nothing but 
terminal sentences consisting entirely of terminal symbols and words. To this, a formal 
system T adds a “terminal grammar” consisting of terminal forms called axioms which 
provide a general description of some universe or domain of discourse U, along with 
rules of inference.  
The axioms – which are terminal with respect to grammatical production and 
constituent symbols, but initial with respect to the axiomatic description of their 
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universe – comprise a boundary between the nonterminal and terminal realms. They 
come in two forms: one, often used in mathematics, continues derivation in the same 
metatemporal direction as production, while the other is typified by continuously 
iterative “laws of nature” or “laws of physics” which evaluate to numbers, accepting the 
values of prior states as input and yielding as output subsequent states which appear to 
arise “orthographically”, in the temporal write direction of symbolic and lexical 
concatenation or composition. The axioms may be applied to known data or 
assumptions regarding U in order to derive consequences via rules of inference, usually 
in the hope and expectation of obtaining useful information – descriptions, predictions, 
or explanations - about U.  
Because the formal system is merely a terminal extension of its formal language L, 
all of the above characterizations of language apply to it. Either no universe or model is 
explicitly included in the formal descriptions of L and T (including the case where 
U=L or U=T), or there is a particular application in mind, as when a formal language 
is structured for computer programming or control of a particular automated system. 
In either case, the association between language and automata persists, but all the 
more strongly due to the increased emphasis on mathematical logic and computational 
applications.     
LEVEL 3: THE METAFORMAL SYSTEM 
The third level of language theory is that of the Metaformal System. It resembles any 
other language in that its grammar brings to bear both rules of production and 
orthographic rules of symbolic concatenation and lexical composition along orthogonal 
generation and write axes which map to a pair of orthogonal axes in the conspansive 
medium of UM. This medium, the conspansive manifold, evolves through a stratified, 
generative, self-dual rescaling operation associated with metaformal grammar ΓMU, 
namely conspansion, which generates a logico-linguistic “boundary algebra” in which 
syntactic distinctions are mapped to closed static surfaces and hypersurfaces, a general 
concept associated with such logicians and mathematicians as Venn, Peirce, Frege, and 
most recently George Spencer-Brown (1969). It incorporates formal languages and 
systems, nonterminal forms and terminal strings, and is therefore linguistic in structure 
and operation. Nevertheless, it includes unique explanations for gravity, cosmic 
expansion, quantum phenomena, consciousness, and even spirituality. It is in every 
important way linguistic in structure and operation. 
As for the trademark linkage of language and information processing, the 
Metaformal System M takes it to its logical conclusion by uniting language with the 
largest and most powerful “information processing system” conceivable, namely, reality 
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at large. Over the last several years, there has been considerable buzz regarding the so-
called “simulation hypothesis” or “simulation theory”, which centers on the possibility 
that despite its propensity to fool us all, reality is an artificial simulation running on a 
vast cosmic computer, astral automaton, or some other kind of host. Some versions of 
this hypothesis seem reminiscent of science fiction movies; others involve ideas 
emerging from ongoing research into “virtual reality”. But the most logically well-
founded and therefore credible version of this idea is the unique logico-linguistic 
approach of the CTMU, with references as far back as the late 1980’s. (1989) The 
CTMU shows that no matter how the issue is slanted, reality can indeed be categorized 
as a “self-simulation” with a nonterminal grammar and a terminal display space of 
which we are all the occupants, the spectators, and to a limited extent, the 
programmers.    
Self-simulation aside, there is a certain logical inevitability to the proposed 
extension. Not only are fields like physics, cosmology, biology, consciousness, AI, and 
philosophy beating their heads against conceptual brick walls when they try to answer 
metaphysical questions for which standard theoretical languages are fundamentally 
inadequate – itself a powerful argument for rummaging around the language 
department for missing conceptual infrastructure – but the questions themselves are 
often garbled. If I might be permitted to employ the third level of language herein 
proposed, modern scientists and philosophers are telors in a state of total denial who - 
while blithely using their own technical languages to pose profound questions and seek 
deep answers – can often do nothing but look about them at the terminal domain T⊂Σ, 
peer at it with all their might, and fail to recognize even the linguistic surface structure 
of the associated M-semilanguage Lo! Little wonder that nothing ever gives. 
But still, there are some very good, very logical reasons to think that any attempt to 
avoid the proposed extension would be futile. Let’s look at it from a metalogical 
vantage. A metatheory is a theory about theories. Theories of science and mathematics 
are formal systems; thus, the capacity in which M incorporates formal languages and 
systems, including those employed throughout the mathematical and empirical 
sciences, is that of a metatheory. An axiom of a metatheory that deals with its object-
theories and/or their axioms is called a meta-axiom, and likewise for any axiom 
referring autologically to itself.  
The CTMU metaformal system can be brought to rest on a single “closure meta-
axiom”, the Analytic Reality Closure Principle (ARC), which is also called the “CTMU 
Identification (or Intelligibility) Axiom”. It can be expressed as the CTMU “master-
equation” (which, interestingly, can be regarded as a logical generalization of Einstein’s 
Equation, with a medium on one side and its content on the other):   
realityINT =* realityEXT  
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This axiomatic equation, which for various reasons cannot be mistaken for a mere 
assumption, expresses the innate self-duality of M. Notice that in addition to being a 
global meta-axiom, it has on its left side an attribute or descriptor, and on its right side a 
collection of operators that are µ-morphic Self-images of a single Global Self-Operator. 
Thus, without too much blame, it might fairly be abbreviated as “the GOD Equation”, 
where “GOD” is acronymic for “Global Operator-Descriptor”. 
This axiomatic equation translates as follows: 
“The intension of  reality (the global property LM = realityINT) is dually equivalent to the 
extension of  reality (the physical universe UM = realityEXT),”  
where dual equivalence describes the situation in which dual entities coincide as aspects of 
a self-dual identity which “glues them together” using mutually distributed structure in 
which they everywhere intersect. 
  ARC can also be rendered as the “CTMU Reality Principle”: 
“Reality contains all and only that which is real.” 
This can be reformulated as a self-contained proof by contradiction: 
“If there were anything outside reality on which reality were in any way dependent 
– e.g., for origination, causation, support, maintenance, or anything else - then
the entire dependency relationship would be real and therefore inside reality. It
follows that reality is self-contained with respect to physical and metaphysical
functions like origination, causation, support, maintenance, etc.”
 This proof by contradiction immediately invalidates the premise of external 
relevance, implying the ontic closure of M = reality. It also means that the level of 
“reality” we are considering is the deepest level possible, namely the CTMU level. This 
is because “reality is ontically self-contained” doubles as a definition of reality under 
which it is idempotent under inclusion (or if one likes, “self-inclusive”, with all the bells 
and whistles required to support this property; Langan, 2017). 
The intelligibility criterion of the Metaformal System M overrides seemingly 
preclusive metalogical results such as the Tarski Undefinability Theorem and the 
Godel Undecidability Theorem. In a nutshell, arguments based on such results, which 
usually apply explicitly to standard formal systems, can only undermine their own 
intelligibility (and that of the formal systems to which they are attached) by 
undermining M. Similarly, insofar as intelligibility relies on classical 2-valued 
propositional logic, objections based on the existence of alternative logical systems, e.g. 
constructive logic, are without force. Other logics may be relevant within bounded 
contexts, but criticisms which rely on them can only compromise their own 
intelligibility by opposing M.  
With any luck, this has brought the reader at least a little closer to a very important 
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realization about the CTMU Metaformal System: as asserted in previous papers, it 
bids fair to be recognized as an integral part of the universal foundational language of 
science and philosophy, and thus an integral part of the scaffolding for the long-awaited 
bridge between science and theology, physics and metaphysics, and physical and 
mental reality. Indeed, it should now be easy to see why it would be very difficult 
indeed to erect any other kind of scaffolding for this purpose.  
Copyright 2018 by C. M. Langan. All rights reserved. 
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